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We made the first estimate of the proportion of fund alpha statistically
attributable to luck rather than skill for a sample of Malaysian Islamic
equity funds. Broadly, the funds do not outperformmarket benchmarks.
In the limited instances where performance is superior, based on a
contemporary methodology, as much as 47% of the observed positive
fund alpha is statistically attributable to luck. Thus, at 5% significance
level, we find only 1.95% of our funds to be genuinely skilled. Our
findings raise questions regarding the equitability of these funds levying
fixed fees, making a case for potential innovation in fund remuneration
structure.
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1. Introduction
In finance literature, both historically as well as currently, there is the debate as to whether actively
managed funds add value. More specifically, the polemic centers on the issue of whether fund managers
possess specific skills such as insightful asset allocation strategies, stock picking ability and market timing,
or are observed fund performance due to merely luck. This issue is not purely academic and has significant
implications and importance to investors and industry players alike. It is not difficult to see why. Actively
managed funds impose fees for the services they provide in the form of front or end loads, and annual
management fees, to name a few. It would be in the interest of investors to knowwhat they are paying for.
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A typical prudent investor would be interested in two things. Firstly, do funds meet performance
expectations and secondly, if favorable performance is observed, is this attributable to skills of the fund
manager or is it mainly due to luck? Investors may not be comfortable with the notion of fund managers
earning fees for outcomes not substantially due to the managers' competence. At a philosophical level,
there is the question of equity or fairness in the manner in which fund managers extract fees. In practical
terms, if luck is the name of the game, shrewd investors may want to consider investing themselves or
opting for passive funds (for example, index-tracking funds). In either case, investors end up paying
substantially less fees. Put simply, why should investors pay fund managers fees if fund performance is
due to luck?
There can be a number of reasons which make investment in mutual funds (or unit trusts, as they are
more commonly known in Malaysia) advantageous. Investors with small initial outlays can get a
diversified portfolio. Investors also do away with potentially distracting and costly portfolio monitoring
costs. Most importantly, or at least most pertinent to this discussion, investors are beneficiaries of the
collective competence of the fund management company, gaining from the fund manager's expertise,
industry knowledge and research capabilities. It can be argued that the first two aforementioned reasons
are less compelling for a growing number of investors. Stock exchanges around the world are reducing the
size of standard board lots to encourage retail participants. The value of diversification itself has been
questioned and even if one subscribes to it, a portfolio need not comprise scores of stocks to benefit from
diversification. In today's age of ever-advancing technology in telecommunications and electronic media,
the ordinary investor can monitor stock portfolios in real time or periodically at negligible pecuniary cost.
The point is, just about any investor with a reasonably-sized investment outlay does not benefit
substantially from mutual funds in terms of diversification or monitoring costs. That being said, the key
selling point for mutual funds is the fund manager's competence. What should convince investors to
handover their investment monies to mutual fund companies instead of opting to invest directly
themselves is the belief that fund managers possess superior investment skills. Doubts over the actual
prevalence of such skills among fund managers may question the very raison d'être of mutual funds.
Interest in this issue need not be limited to investors. Mutual fund companies should be clear about
their customer value proposition and subject themselves to self-enquiry to substantiate the existence of
such value. As investors become more discerning and well-informed, mutual funds have to make a more
convincing case for their product offerings. From a regulator's perspective, as the market for mutual funds
grows and matures, adequate supervision is required to ensure that investors' interests are protected and
that the less astute or misinformed investor is not taken for a ride.
Islamic or Shari'ah compliant mutual funds are a category of mutual funds. Their key differentiating
factor is that they are subjected to a set of Shari'ah compliance rules, chief of which is that assets in the
portfolio must abide by Islamic principles and tenets. In the case of Islamic equity funds, this means that
stocks making up a given fund must be categorically Shari'ah compliant. Towards this end, the Shari'ah
Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission is the gatekeeper, in Malaysia.1 Stocks are screened
to filter firms involved in prohibited sectors like conventional finance and insurance, gambling and
gaming, tobacco, alcohol and entertainment. Financial ratios are also applied to limit the firms'
interest-based income and interest-bearing securities and receivables. If the Islamic equity fund allocates
part of the portfolio to cash or short-term securities, they must be non-interest bearing.2
While the issue of the role of luck in fund performance is applicable to both mainstream and Islamic
mutual funds, we have chosen to focus on the latter, for at least two reasons. Firstly, Islamic finance is
comparatively nascent (albeit growing at healthy rates) and hence understandably less subjected to
empirical analysis. Secondly, Islamic finance has been founded on cornerstone principles such as equity
and fairness. Evidence, if such exists, that luck plays a primary role in observed fund performance,
challenges the philosophical foundations of Islamic finance, at least with respect to Islamic equity funds. At
present, mutual fund firms gain (by charging fees) regardless of the outcome of stock investment. In
Islamic legal nomenclature, Islamic mutual funds are operationalized using the Islamic nominate contract
of wakalah istithmar (agency combined with investment).3 In essence, the client investor appoints the
1 In other jurisdictions, Shari'ah advisory boards maintained by financial institutions may carry out similar functions.
2 For more details of Shari'ah stock screening and Shari'ah rules pertaining to Islamic mutual funds, see www.sc.com.my.
3 See Ayub (2007, p.349).
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fund manager to become his agent to carry out investment of stocks on his behalf. If fund performance is
primarily the result of some random exercise (luck) instead of value-adding investment analysis, one
cannot be blamed for raising somewhat cynical questions as to whether the fees imposed by fund
managers are justified or equitable. The teaser title “heads we win, tails you lose” is aimed at capturing this
sentiment. It is not our intention here to question the Shari'ah compliance status of Islamic funds. Rather,
we seek to find empirical evidence that can potentially elevate Islamic equity funds to better embody the
spirit of justice that Islam propagates. Policy implications arising from expected results are arguably
distinct. The intention is to propose and make a case for changes to the remuneration structure or
mechanism for Islamic equity funds, moving from fee-based to profit-sharing arrangements. This
undertone fits current stylized calls for Islamic finance to embrace risk-sharing principles in its products
and structures. We seek to ensure that there is indeed equity in Islamic equity funds, pun intended.
In the next section, we formalize the research questions of this paper. Section 3 is a review of related
literature, Section 4 details the research methodology employed and Section 5 discusses empirical findings
and offers some intuitive interpretation of the results. In Section 6, we conclude the paper by highlighting
key implications and putting forth some humble suggestions.
2. Research objective
The objective of this paper is to gauge the quantum of risk-adjusted4 performance of Islamic equity
funds in Malaysia attributable to random acts or simply, luck. The intention is not so much to present a
“report card” on the affected fund managers. Rather, it is to make a case to propose possible innovation in
remuneration structures of mutual funds. We can decompose this research aim into three essential steps:
i. Measure risk-adjusted performance of Islamic equity funds.
ii. Apportion part of the observed performance and attribute it to a random element (luck), using
statistical techniques.
iii. Analyze performance of Islamic equity funds after accounting for luck.
Given the chosen yardstick of mutual fund performance (fund alpha), some auxiliary research
objectives can be addressed. We investigate the robustness or applicability of common risk factors
accepted in contemporary research on mutual funds to Shari'ah compliant equity funds. To some extent,
this will give insights into the landscape of Shari'ah compliant equity funds in Malaysia, the prevalence of
dominating investment strategies (if any) and potential presence of idiosyncrasies. In particular, we seek
to find statistical evidence to substantiate the presence of some common or elementary investment
strategies, namely:
i. High versus low beta stocks
ii. Large versus small market capitalization stocks
iii. Value versus growth stocks
iv. Momentum versus contrarian strategies
3. Literature review
We begin our review of literature by addressing the related issue of socially responsible investing (SRI)
or ethics-based investing. The question of whether there is a financial cost associated with SRI is certainly
not a new one. There are voluminous works that have empirically tested the return performances of SRI
funds vis-à-vis mainstream ones. For instance, Renneboog et al. (2008b) find evidence that investors pay a
price for ethics, given that SRI funds in the US, the UK, and a number of countries in Europe and
Asia-Pacific underperform their respective domestic benchmarks. Renneboog et al. (2008a) argued
similarly that SRI investors are willing to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue ethical
objectives. Notwithstanding that, there is little evidence that the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are
statistically different from those of mainstream funds (Bauer et al., 2005). Blanchett (2010) finds that SRI
funds slightly underperformed on pure return basis but outperformed non-SRI peers after accounting for
4 Recording positive returns numbers alone is not sufficient as returns must commensurate the risk profile of the given fund.
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risk, although the results lacked statistical robustness. Faith-based funds (such as Islamic mutual funds)
are often compared with SRI funds. In a study by Lyn and Zychowicz (2010), it was found that generally,
faith-based funds did better than SRI funds. It is noteworthy that while there are some common grounds
between socially responsible investing and faith-based investing, there is little justification to argue that
the latter is a sub-category of the former, much less to equate the two. Forte and Miglietta (2007) offered
qualitative and quantitative evidence that Islamic funds were characteristically different from SRI funds in
terms of asset allocation and econometric profile.
The dearth in empirical literature studying performance of Islamic funds is both understandable (given
that in terms of size, they are currently still dwarfed bymainstream funds) and increasingly being addressed.
A growing number of published works compare the performance of Islamic mutual funds with that of their
conventional counterparts. For the most part, it is a mixed bag of results. Alam and Rajjaque (2010) claim
empirical evidence of Islamic funds outperforming conventional ones, while Hayat and Kraeussl (2011) find
results of Islamic investment funds underperforming. A number of studies also conclude that Islamic funds
are market competitive, finding that risk-adjusted returns of Shari'ah-compliant funds are not statistically
significantly different from those of mainstream funds (see Elfakhani et al., 2005; Girard and Hassan, 2008;
Hakim and Rashidian, 2004; Hussein, 2004; Merdad et al., 2010). Apart from finding no discernible pecuniary
penalty associated with adherence to religious tenets, these papers also observed that Islamic funds' returns
tend to fare better during bearish markets while lag behind conventional funds during periods of market
uptrend. Many hence claim that Islamic mutual funds are good hedging investment alternatives during
market downturns and recessions. Dimensions of analysis extend beyond relative fund performance and risk/
return characteristics. For example, Hoepner et al. (2011) also examined investment style and found Islamic
funds favoring growth and small cap stocks. Afza and Rauf (2009) investigated fund attributes that
significantly influence fund performance.
Malaysian Shari'ah compliant mutual funds have had their share of empirical analysis. Employing
widely-used fund performance yardsticks such as the Sharpe and Treynor ratios, Jensen's alpha, the
Modigliani Measure, and the Information ratio, Abdullah et al. (2007) concluded that Islamic funds fared
better during bearish market conditions while conventional funds outperformed Islamic ones when the
market is bullish. They also found that both fund types had poor diversification levels. Their empirical
results suggest that the fund managers were not very competent at stock-picking and were bad market
timers. Shamsher et al. (2000) found no significant differences in the performance of actively and
passively managed Malaysian funds, where both underperformed the market portfolio. Annuar et al.
(1997) offered some evidence of positive selectivity performance, but poor timing abilities and
diversification levels among some Malaysian mutual funds studied. Interestingly, Mansor and Bhatti
(2011) published empirical evidence wherein conventional and Islamic Malaysian mutual funds
outperformed the market portfolio. In their sample and evaluation period, the Islamic portfolio slightly
underperformed and was found to be riskier, when compared to conventional funds. Some papers
analyzed different aspects of Malaysian mutual funds. As examples, Ismail and Shakrani (2003) used
conditional CAPM to establish that beta explains cross-sectional differences in Islamic mutual fund returns
while Saad et al. (2010) investigated the efficiency of Malaysian mutual funds and found some Islamic
funds to perform better in this respect, compared to conventional funds.
Using statistical methods to empirically discern the performance of mutual funds attributable to fund
managers' skills from just luck is not a new proposition. Barras et al. (2010) employs a direct yet
statistically robust method, which this paper adopts, to estimate true fund alphas. Working with a
substantial sample of US mutual funds, it was found that, among other things, proportions of truly skilled
funds were close to zero, in recent time periods. Fama and French (2010) used bootstrap simulations on
US equity mutual fund data and reported similar findings. Only few funds were able to produce
benchmark-adjusted expected returns adequate to cover their imposed costs.
Finally, it is not difficult to find literature that discusses mutual funds from a Shari'ah or fiqh (Islamic
legal rules) perspective. However, most if not all of these focus primarily on issues like stock screening,
portfolio income purification, zakah, reporting and broad corporate governance matters. We have yet to
come across published work that scrutinizes present Islamic mutual fund fee structures either from a legal
standpoint or from economic intuition based on empirical findings. An eminent Shari'ah scholar, Sheikh
Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo did however remark that “a significant number of managed Islamic equity funds
function without Shari'ah supervision of any sort” and that “if management is slow to address the issue,
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then the remedy will come from the investors themselves”.5 We concur with DeLorenzo in that investors
“expect more from the professionals who manage their money… in terms of performance, [and] …
Shari'ah compliance”. Advocating customer advocacy and moral purification, DeLorenzo scraped the
surface of the subject of our paper by calling for reasonable fee structures which should be
well-communicated. The idea that there should be justice in the fees imposed by funds is not uniquely
Shari'ah-inspired but rather appeals to simple human expectations. Ramasamy and Yeung (2003) found
transactional costs to be among the top three factors that matter when it comes to mutual funds.
In light of present literature on Islamic mutual funds as briefly discussed above, we believe that our
paper is novel in at least two respects. Firstly, we apply empirical techniques to statistically identify
performance of Islamic equity funds attributable to luck. Secondly, we offer our findings as a justification
for a proposal to amend the fee structure of Islamic mutual funds, which we argue will better embody the
spirit of the Shari'ah.
4. Research methodology
4.1. The basic idea
The objective of this paper is to compute the percentage of Islamic equity funds that exhibit true
positive performance, after accounting for the ‘luck’ factor. The chosen performance yardstick is fund
alpha, defined here as the excess return over a stipulated (market) benchmark. As alpha is computed as
the constant coefficient resulting from a regression of a time series of fund and market returns, fund
returns are in a sense risk-adjusted. Returns are computed on monthly basis based on total returns6 and
are net of a risk-free rate. The proxy for the risk-free rate is the Malaysian T-bill Band 4 mid-rate.7
We endeavor to offer multiple methods of computing alpha. This provides some degree of robustness
in drawing conclusions. Three common models of alpha computation will be adopted, namely:
i. As per capital asset pricing model (CAPM) described in Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)
ii. Fama and French's (1993) 3-factor model
iii. Carhart's (1997) 4-factor model
In essence, the approach here is to construct a performance attributionmodel— identifying factors that
have empirically “explained” observed fund return. These factors represent elementary investment
strategies, namely:
i. High versus low beta stocks
ii. Large versus small market capitalization stocks
iii. Value versus growth stocks
iv. Momentum versus contrarian strategies
CAPM addresses the first strategy, Fama and French's 3-factor alpha includes the first three while
Carhart's model incorporates all four factors. We briefly elaborate on each of these factors below. After
alpha is computed, we refer to the methodology used in Barras et al. (2010), described in brief below, to
statistically identify the portion of alpha that is attributable to luck. Removing this component from
observed alpha will give us the true fund alpha.
4.2. The dependent variable
We confine our sample to Shari'ah compliant equity funds currently operating in Malaysia, with
adequate data points to execute regression. The following funds are excluded — balanced funds (mix of
5 See “Shari'ah Supervision of Islamic Mutual Funds”, presented by Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo at the 4th Harvard Forum on
Islamic Finance, downloadable at http://www.failaka.com.
6 This measure takes into account dividend issuances, splits, bonus issues, etc.
7 Basis of choice of this proxy is primarily availability of suitable data spanning over the estimation period. Band 4 is defined as
having 68 to 91 days to maturity.
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debt and equity), regional funds (funds investing substantially in non-Malaysian equities, typically within
Asia Pacific), index (passively-managed) funds, and wholesale funds.8 Applying this filter, from a total of
167 Shari'ah compliant funds, we are left with 63 funds, which form our sample. The estimation period is
from September 2001 to June 2012, with a maximum of 130 (monthly) observations.9 As mentioned
above, the variable represents monthly total fund returns net of the proxy risk-free rate. Two sets of fund
returns are computed — before and after fund expenses are deducted.10
4.3. The regressors
4.3.1. Market return
As proxy for the market return factor, we have relied on a number of benchmark stock indices, namely:
i. Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (conventional bellwether index, representing top 30 stocks by
market capitalization)
ii. FBM Shari'ah Index (broad-based index of Shari'ah compliant stocks) [FBMSHA]
iii. FBM Hijrah Index (alternative index of Shari'ah compliant stocks)
iv. FBM Emas Index (broad-based index of all stocks on Bursa Malaysia)
v. FBM Top 100 Index (index of top 100 stocks by market cap)
vi. FBM Small Cap (index of small market capitalization stocks)
vii. FBM Mid 70 (index of mid-sized market cap stocks).
viii. A constructed value-weighted (by market capitalization) index of all Shari'ah compliant stocks
included in this sample (similar in approach to Fama and French, 1993) [VWINDEX]
We intentionally explore multiple market proxies to introduce some robustness in our model. We
select two indices – FBMSHA and VWINDEX – for subsequent regression equations to reduce complexity
and make the empirical work less voluminous.11 Note that the FBM Shari'ah and FBM Hijrah indices were
only introduced in December 2006 and April 2007, respectively, making the estimation period shorter for
regression equations involving those indices.
4.3.2. Size
There are ample reported empirical findings that small stocks outperform large stocks. Hence the size
of firms is accepted by many as a common factor that typically “explains” observed returns. To incorporate
this dimension in our analysis, we regress fund returns against a proxy for this common risk factor in stock
returns. We do not regress against the actual size of the fund in question. Instead, portfolios are
constructed to mimic the “size” factor and this represents a shared and undiversifiable risk factor.
Similarly, many claim that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks.12 To represent this aspect, we
rely on the book-to-market equity ratio.
Towards this end, we employ the method as per Fama and French (1993). Firstly, we sort all Shari'ah
compliant stocks based on 2 criteria — size (measured by market capitalization) and book-to-market
equity ratio.13 For size, we use the median size of Main Board stocks to split all stocks into 2 groups— small
(S) and Big (B). For the book-to-market ratio, we create 3 groups — bottom 30% (L), middle 40% (M) and
top 30% (H). From there we can construct 6 portfolios:
i. S/L: small stock with low book-to-market equity ratio
ii. S/M: small stock with medium book-to-market equity ratio
iii. S/H: small stock with high book-to-market equity ratio
8 Note that the typical equity fund does invest a small proportion of the portfolio in cash and short-term securities.
9 For some more recently launched mutual funds, the estimation period is shorter.
10 Reported expense ratios are used, which presumably includes management expenses. Front and/or back loads are not accounted
for here. In a few cases where expense ratio data is not available, a conservative 1% per annum is assumed.
11 Selection of these two indices is mainly based on the fact they better reflect the nature of the funds' stock composition.
12 Values stocks are typically characterized by low price-to-book equity ratios, low price-to-earnings multiples or high dividend
yields.
13 We limit ourselves to Main Board stocks. Out of 828 stocks, about 86% or 716 stocks are Shari'ah compliant (as at July 2012).
From this, 23 stocks have missing or insufficient data, leaving us with 693 stocks to work with.
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iv. B/L: big stock with low book-to-market equity ratio
v. B/M: big stock with medium book-to-market equity ratio
vi. B/H: big stock with high book-to-market equity ratio
The rationale for three groupings for the book-to-market ratio and only two for size is that there is
empirical evidence that the former has a stronger role in influencing average stock returns (Fama and
French, 1992). Monthly value-weighted returns are computed for the six portfolios. To mimic the risk
factor in returns related to size, we take the difference between (i) the simple average returns of the three
small stock portfolios and (ii) the simple average returns of the three big stock portfolios. In this way we
observe the size effect while controlling for the book-to-market ratio factor. Portfolios are constructed
annually, in June of every year, as per Fama and French (1993).
4.3.3. Book-to-market equity ratio
Along a similar vein, to mimic the risk factor in returns related to book-to-market equity, we take the
difference between (i) the simple average returns of the two high book-to-market equity ratio stock
portfolios and (ii) the simple average returns of the two low book-to-market equity ratio portfolios. Using
mimicking portfolios for the common risk factors in returns minimize the variance of firm-specific factors.
To add a further dimension to our analysis, we also computed size and book-to-market equity ratios
based on free float numbers. We compute market capitalization (free float) as the share price multiplied
by number of shares freely traded on the exchanged (as compared to total number of shares on issue).
4.3.4. Momentum strategy short-term anomaly
There are empirical evidences that adopting a momentum strategy can result in short-term abnormal
performance. This is sometimes termed the “hot hands” effect. Some have suggested that this is market
inefficiency due to slow reaction to information. To account for this in our model, we employ a variation of
the method of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). At each month, stock returns of all Shari'ah compliant stocks
are ranked. Two portfolios are constructed, using equal-weights, comprising the highest 30% and lowest
30% 6-month returns lagged one month of the said stocks.14 We then find the difference in (current month
t) returns of these two portfolios, and this is regressed against fund returns. Portfolios are re-formed
monthly. We compute two versions of this “momentum” return — equal weighting and value-weighted.
4.4. Regression equations
Given the variables briefly discussed above, we formed 20 regression equations, listed below.
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−klci;t þ εi;t ð1Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ εi;t ð2Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmhij;t þ εi;t ð3Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−emas;t þ εi;t ð4Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−top100;t þ εi;t ð5Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−scap;t þ εi;t ð6Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−mid70;t þ εi;t ð7Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−vwindex;t þ εi;t ð8Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ εi;t ð9Þ
14 In essence, we take the average 6 month return of month t-7 to month t-1 for each stock.
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ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−vwindex;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ εi;t ð10Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−emas;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ εi;t ð11Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−top100;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ εi;t ð12Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ β4;i  rmom;t þ εi;t ð13Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−vwindex;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ β4;i  rmom;t þ εi;t ð14Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ β4;i  rmom−vw;t þ εi;t ð15Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize−ff ;t þ β3;i  rbtm−ff ;t þ εi;t ð16Þ
rAE;i;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ εi;t ð17Þ
rAE;i;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−vwindex;t þ β2;i  rsize;t þ β3;i  rbtm;t þ β4;i  rmom;t þ εi;t ð18Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−fbmsha;t þ β2;i  rsize−trim;t þ β3;i  rbtm−trim;t þ εi;t ð19Þ
ri;t ¼ αi þ β1;i  rm−vwindex;t þ β2;i  rsize−trim;t þ β3;i  rbtm−trim;t þ β4;i  rmom;t þ εi;t ð20Þ
ri and rAE represent fund returns before and after expenses are deducted, respectively. rm is the market
return proxy for the various indices used. rsize and rsize-ff are the “size” common risk factors resulting from
the constructed portfolio, with the latter relying on free float numbers. Similarly, rbtm and rbtm-ff represent
the “book-to-market equity” risk factor. rsize-trim and rbtm-trim are constructed portfolios with the top 5% and
bottom 5% (sorted by market capitalization per period) removed. Finally, rmom and rmom-vw are the
momentum strategy risk factors, computed on equal and value-weighted basis, respectively. Eqs. (1)
through (8) are standard CAPM, while the remaining equations are a mix of Fama and French's 3-factor
model and Carhart's 4-factor model. Given the sample size of 63 funds, a total of 1260 (63 × 20)
regressions were run.
4.5. Identifying false discoveries in fund performance
Once the set of fund alphas are obtained, to measure funds that have been lucky rather than skilled, we
employ the method used in Barras et al. (2010). From a cross section of alphas, we use the t-statistic as the
performance measure. t-hati = α-hati / σ-hatα-hat,i where α-hati is the estimated alpha for fund i and
σ-hatα-hat,i is its estimated standard deviation. It has been shown that the t-statistic has superior statistical
properties relative to alpha because alpha estimates have differing precision across funds with varying
lives and portfolio volatilities (Kosowski et al., 2006). A significance level (γ) is chosen and thresholds
implied by the chosen significance level are identified. A multiple hypothesis test is conducted to
determine the percentages of funds belonging to three categories (i) unskilled funds, (ii) zero alpha funds
and (iii) skilled funds.
The third category, “skilled funds” denoted E(Sγ+) comprises (a) true positive alpha funds, (b) zero
alpha funds that have been lucky, and (c) negative alpha funds that have been lucky. The possibility of
(c) is quite remote and thus is not considered. To identify the proportion of true positive alpha funds, we
estimate (ii), denoted by E(Fγ+), and simply subtract it from E(Sγ+).
E Tγ
þ  ¼ E Sγþ
 
−E Fγ
þ 
Zero alpha funds that are lucky are estimated by the equation:
E Fγ
þ  ¼ π0  γ=2
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π0 is estimated using an approach developed in Storey (2002) called the false discovery rate (FDR)
approach. Its sole inputs are the two-sided p-values associated with the (alpha) t-statistics of each fund
in the data set. Via a histogram of the funds' p-values we can estimate π0. More precisely, π0(λ*) =
[W(λ*) / M] × [1 / (1 − λ*)] where W(λ*) is the number of funds with p-values exceeding λ* and M is
the total number of funds. λ* is selected using a simple bootstrap procedure.
Similarly, to estimate the proportion of true negative alpha funds, we use the formula E(Tγ−) = E(Sγ−) −
E(Fγ−), where E(Fγ−) = E(Fγ+).
Fig. 1 below illustrates graphically the logic of this method.
Fig. 1. Outcome of multiple performance tests. Panel A shows a hypothetical distribution of fund t-statistic across three groups
of funds — skilled, unskilled and zero-alpha. Within each group there is probability of a given fund being lucky (right-tail) or
unlucky (left-tail). For example, as panel A illustrates, within the zero-alpha group, there may be funds that are categorically
(in fact) zero-alpha and yet may produce significant positive or negative fund alpha t-statistics (lucky and unlucky,
respectively). Hence when we have a cross-section of alpha t-statistics, as panel B illustrates, a portion of the right and left tail
of the distribution contains funds that are simply lucky and unlucky, respectively, despite observed significant (non-zero)
t-statistics. The method described above attempts to quantify this proportion, thereby arriving at percentages of genuinely
skilled and unskilled funds.
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5. Results and interpretation
5.1. Regression statistics
We begin with results of the standard CAPM model regressions [Eqs. (1) through (8)].
We do not find it surprising that the top two indices are the Shari'ah based ones. After all, the dependent
variable is returns of Shari'ah-compliant funds. The Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI), despite being the
bellwether index, is lower down the list. Again, this is expected given that firstly, it is a much narrower index
(only 30 stocks). Secondly and more importantly, between 33% and 40% of stocks that make up the index are
non-Shari'ah compliant.15 What makes for a more interesting observation is the fact that the funds in this
sample appear to prefer larger capitalization stocks in their portfolio. At least on the basis of adjusted R2, the
Top100 index is a better market return proxy for these funds, vis-à-vis the Mid70 and Small Cap indices. A
cursory examination of portfolio composition of these funds confirms this. The top 10 stocks bymarket value
in each fund, typically large cap equities, on the average make up about 52% of the fund's portfolio.
Computed alphas are not statistically different from zero, indicating that zero-alpha funds dominate
this sample of Islamic equity funds. Diagnostic testing of regression results reveals some cases of
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, thus the Newey-West (1987) adjustment is applied to all
regressions.16 Given the results in Table 1, we opted to proceed with subsequent regressions with only
two indices — FBMSHA and VWINDEX.17
Our results (see Table 2) appear to indicate that Fama and French's 3-factor model and Carhart's
4-factor model are not relevant to our analysis. In other words, firm size, value versus growth stocks and
the momentum strategy anomaly do not empirically explain the observed performance of Islamic equity
funds in our sample. Before we arrive at such a bold conclusion, it is important to note that even the
market return parameter was found to be statistically insignificant. In light of our results from regression
Eqs. (1) through (8), where all market return proxies were indeed significant, we entertain the notion of
possible multicollinearity among the regressors in regression Eqs. (9) through (20). We conducted a
non-exhaustive investigation of this possibility and found that in numerous instances, regressions pairing
the said regressors resulted in very high adjusted R2 values.
Other than this, data-related inadequacies could also explain our seemingly counter-intuitive results.
Some of the funds included in our sample are relatively new ones, and hence only have a short time series of
historical reported return performance. Lack of adequate data points could have affected the efficacy of our
estimations. One needs to bear in mind that the reported p-values in Table 2 represent the average of the 63
funds. Showing aggregated results can sometimes conceal important statistical insights. For instance, we
found quite a number of funds that reported very low p-values for all regressors (market return and
constructed common risk factors), indicating that, for these funds at least, the 3-factor and 4-factormodels do
apply. It can be contended that some funds with data insufficiency issues may have distorted the overall
summarized findings.We have opted against removing these potentially problematic funds from our sample
because we are constrained by our already small sample size. The primary objective of our analysis is to
analyze fund alphas and for our chosen methodology, a decent cross-section of alpha values is desirable.
Trimming our sample will work against this objective. Another factor that could have contributed to this
ostensible anomaly is the employed method of portfolio construction to mimic the risk factors. In our
regressions above, we have emulated Fama and French (1993) which uses value-weighted portfolio returns
reconstructed on an annual basis. In an alternative portfolio construction (not reported here but available
upon request) which uses average portfolio returns reconstructed on a monthly basis, market return
parameterswere all found to be significant, albeit common risk factors variables still statistically insignificant.
We do not consider the results obtained for regression Eqs. (9) through (20) as show-stoppers. After
all, we still have the computed alphas from the standard CAPM regressions. Given that this does imply that
size, value-versus-growth and momentum strategies are irrelevant, in the paragraphs that follow, we
15 Furthermore, typically half of the top 10 stocks by market cap are non-Shari'ah compliant and the KLCI is a market capitalization-
weighted index.
16 For example, for the set of regressions pertaining to Eq. (1), in 24 out of 63 cases, the Langrage multiplier (LM) test of residual
serial correlation test statistic p-value was smaller than 0.05.
17 FBMSHA has the highest adjusted R2 amongst the indices while VWINDEX, despite its low adjusted R2, is consistent with Fama
and French (1993). Both indices reflect the substantial nature of the funds (Shari'ah compliant stocks).
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briefly indulge in intuitively plausible explanations to consider the notion that these common risk factors
are in fact uncommon, at least with respect to our sample set.
While the Fama and French, and Carhart models have gained recognition amongst published works, there
are also numerous empirical findings that cast doubt on the efficacy of CAPM and its variations in explaining
observed stock and fund returns. Some argue that these aforementioned models are merely empirically fitted
and do not have solid theoretical foundations. As far as firm size goes, it could very well be that in Malaysian
equities, there is a lack of a systematic difference in rate of returns between large and smallfirms. Alternatively,
we could argue that even if such a difference in returns exists, if the funds in our sample limit their portfolios to
mainly large cap equities, such a risk factorwould not be statistically evident. Put simply, the “size” risk factor is
intended to capture the claim that smaller firms are riskier (for example, less capable of weathering financial
distress) and hence require higher rates of return to compensate. If mutual funds do not invest in these small
firms, this risk factor becomes irrelevant. Our earlier observation above that the funds in our sample have a
tendency to allocate portfolio funds to larger cap stocks render some support to this line of reasoning.
The same could be said of the “book-to-market equity” risk factor. Either there exists no consistent
difference in returns of value stocks compared to growth stocks or funds tend to concentrate their portfolios
on one category of stock. It is well known that trading in theMalaysian equity market is “top-heavy” in that a
small number of stockswith the highestmarket capitalizations form the bulk ofmarket trading activity. As for
themomentum strategy, our empirical evidence suggests that such an investment strategy is not prevalent, at
least not with the Islamic equity funds we have in our sample. Another possible explanation is that our
account of the momentum strategy anomaly is not sufficiently robust.
Our results could also reflect an idiosyncrasy of Shari'ah compliant stocks. In other words, the size,
value-versus-growth and momentum strategy anomalies may exist in Malaysian equities, just not among
Shari'ah compliant Malaysian stocks. Shari'ah compliant stocks are differentiated, amongst other criteria, in
that debt financing of firms is restricted to a particular ratio. Hence, Shari'ah compliant firms tend to be less
leveraged. It has been argued in CAPM-related literature that smaller stocks have empirically outperformed
larger stocks because the former commands for a higher risk premium reflecting greater risk of financial
distress (which the standard CAPM beta does not specifically measure thus the value-adding “size” common
risk factor). It follows that if Shari'ah compliant stocks, by virtue of debt-related financial ratios applied in the
stock screening process, have contained levels of leverage, thereby reducing overall risk of financial distress, a
statistically pronounced difference between small and large Shari'ah compliant stocks, may be absent. Put
differently, the “size” common risk factor originates from risk of financial distress which financial leverage
brings. If this leverage is low, such an additional risk premium may not be present, or brought down to
statistically negligible levels. The same line of argument can bemadewith respect to the value-versus-growth
empirical anomaly. If certain characteristics of Shari'ah complaint stocks can be associated with those
prevalent among either value or growth stocks, it would not be surprising to find the empirical absence of this
anomaly.While a case can bemade to suggest the above, tomaintain brevity and focus of our studywe refrain
from further empirical investigation into such a possibility.
While Fama and French attribute apparent failings of classical CAPM in explaining observed asset return
performance to the size and value-versus-growth common risk factors, this is by no means the only line of
reasoning that has garnered some following. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2003) introduced the concept of
“bad beta” and “good beta”. Essentially, they argue that CAPM beta comprises two components — one
Table 1
Regression statistics for standard CAPM model. The table lists results ranked by adjusted R2.
Alpha (constant term) Index (regressor) Adjusted R2
Coeff. Std Err t ratio p-value Coeff. p-value
FBMSHA 0.001 0.005 0.321 0.549 0.408 0.032 0.282
FBMHIJ 0.000 0.005 0.048 0.609 0.410 0.030 0.278
EMAS 0.001 0.004 0.359 0.522 0.417 0.032 0.275
TOP100 0.001 0.004 0.297 0.526 0.428 0.030 0.274
KLCI 0.001 0.004 0.317 0.529 0.438 0.031 0.268
MID70 0.002 0.004 0.410 0.518 0.334 0.028 0.259
SCAP 0.003 0.004 0.722 0.461 0.257 0.059 0.216
VWINDEX 0.004 0.004 1.133 0.304 0.061 0.036 0.044
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Table 2
Regression statistics for Fama and French's 3-factor model and Carhart's 4-factor model. Adjusted R2 values are comparable to the standard CAPMmodel regression equations. Computed alphas are
statistically not different from zero, implying dominance of zero-alpha funds. A key empirical observation here is that not only are all common risk factor variables from constructed portfolios (size,
book-to-market equity, momentum strategy) statistically non-significant (at a 5% significance level), even the market return reported p-values are above any reasonable significance thresholds.
Reported p-values are Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity consistent estimates, under the null hypothesis that regression parameters are equal to zero. Discussion of
observed coefficients vis-à-vis theoretical expectations, as well as variations in indices used and methods of computation (value-weighted momentum returns, using free float numbers, fund
returns after deducting expenses, removal of outliers) becomes somewhat unproductive given that reported p-values reflect statistically insignificant variables.
Risk factors Alpha Market return Size Book-to-market Momentum Adjusted
R2
Regression
Eq.
Note Market
proxy
Size Book-to-
market
Momentum Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
9 FBMSHA – – 0.003 0.507 0.613 0.398 0.534 0.612 0.201 0.607 0.256
10 VWINDEX – – 0.001 0.548 −0.136 0.515 −1.048 0.522 −0.646 0.082 0.259
11 EMAS – – 0.002 0.525 0.473 0.202 0.322 0.633 −0.053 0.611 0.257
12 TOP100 – – 0.002 0.536 0.469 0.165 0.223 0.657 −0.021 0.658 0.251
13 FBMSHA – – – 0.002 0.542 0.720 0.334 0.729 0.512 0.364 0.503 −0.142 0.186 0.268
14 VWINDEX – – – 0.000 0.549 −0.196 0.484 −1.205 0.468 −0.657 0.098 −0.078 0.371 0.267
15 Value-
weighted
mom.
FBMSHA – – – 0.003 0.436 0.691 0.347 0.736 0.457 0.031 0.638 −0.315 0.317 0.301
16 Free float FBMSHA – – 0.003 0.466 0.723 0.303 0.816 0.524 0.329 0.525 0.263
17 After
expenses
FBMSHA – – 0.001 0.598 0.613 0.398 0.534 0.612 0.201 0.607 0.256
18 After
expenses
VWINDEX – – – −0.001 0.510 −0.196 0.484 −1.205 0.468 −0.657 0.098 −0.078 0.371 0.267
19 Remove
outliers
FBMSHA – – 0.001 0.549 0.253 0.249 −0.141 0.632 −0.524 0.476 0.289
20 Remove
outliers
VWINDEX – – – 0.003 0.446 −0.124 0.364 −1.214 0.129 −0.670 0.401 −0.010 0.160 0.269
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reflecting news about the market's future cash flow prospects and the other pertaining to market-wide
discount rates. Value of the market portfolio may drop when there is bad news about prospects of future
cash flows. Likewise, market value can also diminish due to increases in the prevailing discount rate or cost
of capital that is applied to the cash flows. In the case of the latter, while wealth decreases, future
investment opportunities improve (when discount rates revert) thus making this component of beta
“good”, relative to the former type. Small and value stocks have empirically shown superior results because
their beta is more predominantly “good beta”.
Drawing upon the rich literature on asset pricing models, one can spawn a plethora of logical
reasoning, many backed to some extent by empirical findings, to account for observed asset return
performances. We have only highlighted but a few here. We reiterate that our focus is not on evaluating
our chosen asset pricing model but rather to compute fund alphas. We have indulged in the above
discussion simply to shed some light into otherwise nonsensical empirical results.
5.2. Analysis of fund alphas
In estimating π0 we were not able to produce similar results as per Barras et al. (2010). In particular,
the shape of the histograms of the funds' p-values did not level off beyond a certain value (indicative of λ*)
as suggested by the said paper.18 We attribute this to the relatively much smaller size of our sample.
Hence, instead of selecting λ* by reference to the histogram or via bootstrap, we opted to estimate the λ*
value that produces the lowest π0. We believe that this approach conservatively estimates proportions of
zero alpha funds that are “lucky” and “unlucky”.
In Table 3 we show the percentile breakdowns of fund alphas by varying levels of significance, averaged by
varying methods of computing alpha.19 Our results indicate that the bulk of non-zero alpha funds are in fact
skilled funds. This is contrary to Barras et al. (2010) which found the reverse to be true. In their paper, which
had a substantially larger sample of US mutual funds, there were more negative alpha (as well as unskilled)
funds. However, thisfinding does not saymuchpraise for the performance of Shari'ah compliant equity funds in
Malaysia. This is because the quantum of skilled funds leaves much to be desired, at least from the perspective
of the investor. At a 5% significance level, percentage of skilled funds range from0% to ameager 1.95%. Of course
when significance levels are increased, these percentages increase. We recognize that our method contains a
bias towards “accepting” the null hypothesis (that funds have zero alphas).20 We acknowledge type II errors
(probability thatwe incorrectly categorize a fund as a zero alpha fundwhen in fact it has a non-zero alpha), but
argue that the cost of type I error is comparatively higher, at least from the standpoint of the investor. Most
investors would put their investment monies into one fund.21 Hence, given that our results indicate that most
funds are zero alpha funds, the cost (to the investor) of mistakenly choosing a fund that turns out yielding
zero-alpha is higher than passing up a positive-alpha fund (thinking it was zero-alpha).
Based on our results, we estimate that between 35 and 47% of observed positive alpha in funds can be
attributed to luck. The resulting quantumof skilled funds does not surprise us, and they are comparable to those
reported in Barras et al. (2010). To add insult to injury, when we compute percentages of skilled funds net of
expenses, they drop to zero ormarginally above zero, with the exception of the 40% significance level.22We can
summarize our findings above simply as follows. The bulk of funds in our study do not perform better than our
set of stipulated benchmarks (that is,majority are zero alpha funds). The goodnews is, among those that are not
zero-alpha funds, there are more that outperform than underperform. However, the percentages of this former
category (skilled funds that outperform the benchmark) are arguably low. As far as the role of luck in recording
superior return performance,we estimate that nearly half of these said performersweremerely lucky.Whenwe
consider returns net of expenses, the presence of these superior performing funds are almost wiped out.
18 Our histograms can be found in Appendix A.
19 For similar statistics by regression equation, see Appendix B.
20 Our p-values reflect the probability that we erroneously categorize a fund as having negative or positive alpha when In fact it has
a zero alpha (type I error).
21 It is unlikely that many investors, particularly retail ones, would spread their investment funds across multiple mutual funds. The
diversification of risk sought is presumably achieved via the mutual fund instrument. Investors value the convenience of monitoring
when dealing with only a single fund. Diversifying across many funds would defeat the very purpose of opting for mutual funds as
the chosen investment vehicle. We believe this to be the case at least for Malaysia.
22 Even at this level, only 4.64% are estimated to be skilled.
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Table 3
Percentile breakdown of fund alphas by varying significance levels. The table above lists the percentages of statistically significant negative (positive) alpha funds, percentages of funds computed as
unlucky (lucky) and hence percentages of remaining funds deemed truly unskilled (skilled), at varying levels of significance. Averages are on equal weighting basis, separated by method of
computing alpha together with an overall average. Distribution of percentiles appears to be “skewed” towards positive alpha funds in that percentages of negative alpha funds as well as unskilled
funds are substantially lower than positive alpha funds, across the board. Overall, unskilled funds make up 0% of the sample, at best, and 1.36% of funds with significance level stretched to 0.40.
Skilled funds, on the other hand, are about 1.15% of funds sampled at the 0.05 significance level and 17.52% at the very “generous” significance level of 0.40. Understandably, the averages computed
net of expenses show the smallest percentiles of skilled funds and highest for unskilled funds.
Negative alpha funds Positive alpha funds
Significance level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.40
Average standard CAPM Significant 0.00% 0.79% 1.98% 2.58% 4.76% 7.34% 2.98% 8.73% 13.10% 16.07% 23.41% 32.14% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.74% 1.75% 2.34% 4.50% 7.25% 1.03% 3.41% 5.12% 6.77% 10.11% 13.65% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.05% 0.23% 0.24% 0.26% 0.09% 1.95% 5.32% 7.98% 9.30% 13.31% 18.49% Skilled
Average 3-factor model Significant 0.00% 0.45% 1.13% 2.04% 3.40% 5.90% 1.81% 4.76% 7.26% 8.84% 18.82% 28.57% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.45% 1.13% 2.04% 3.40% 5.90% 1.03% 2.74% 3.92% 4.84% 8.00% 11.46% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.78% 2.02% 3.34% 4.00% 10.82% 17.11% Skilled
Average 4-factor model Significant 0.32% 1.59% 3.17% 5.40% 8.57% 12.70% 1.27% 4.44% 8.25% 11.11% 18.41% 28.57% Significant
Unlucky 0.32% 1.22% 1.98% 2.75% 5.56% 7.41% 0.87% 2.37% 3.32% 4.85% 8.39% 12.03% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.37% 1.19% 2.65% 3.02% 5.29% 0.40% 2.07% 4.93% 6.26% 10.02% 16.54% Skilled
Average net of expenses Significant 0.00% 2.38% 4.76% 8.73% 11.90% 18.25% 0.79% 2.38% 3.17% 3.17% 5.56% 14.29% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.46% 1.79% 2.12% 4.37% 5.03% 0.79% 2.25% 3.17% 3.17% 5.16% 9.65% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.93% 2.98% 6.61% 7.54% 13.23% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 4.64% Skilled
Average — all Significant 0.08% 0.87% 1.98% 3.10% 5.24% 8.17% 2.14% 6.27% 9.84% 12.30% 20.56% 30.00% Significant
Unlucky 0.08% 0.76% 1.59% 2.34% 4.38% 6.82% 0.99% 2.92% 4.25% 5.62% 8.94% 12.48% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.11% 0.39% 0.76% 0.86% 1.36% 1.15% 3.35% 5.59% 6.69% 11.61% 17.52% Skilled
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5.3. Some additional dimensions of analysis
Wealso examine the average expense ratio, load factor, age and size of funds in our sample, categorized by
negative, zero and positive alpha (Table 4). It was found that for all significance levels, the expense ratios and
load factors for zero alpha fundswere always higher than those of non-zero alpha funds.23 As for age and size,
they decrease monotonically from negative to zero to positive alpha funds, at all significance levels.
The implications of this finding, for the investor, are that these characteristics can somewhat serve as
indicative of expected fund return performance. It appears that smaller and more recently launched funds
tend to perform better. It could be the case that funds are inclined to divert their better resources and fund
management talent to newer funds to chalk upmore impressive return records so as to ensure survivability
of the funds. There could also be impression management at play — it is easier to record superior return
numberswhenworkingwith a smaller net asset base. To a lesser extent, expense ratios and load factors can
be used to weed out zero alpha funds. Superior-performing funds generally tend to impose lower charges
on their clientele.
6. Implications of findings and suggestions
Our empirical work provides some statistical evidence that the risk-adjusted performance of Shari'ah
compliant equity funds in Malaysia does not exceed that of market benchmarks, for the most part. Further,
in the limited instances where superior performance is observed, a significant proportion of it is
statistically attributable to luck, rather than skill of fund managers. We iterate that our purpose here is not
to evaluate the performance of the said fund managers per se. Instead, it is to make a case for an
alternative structure of remuneration for Islamic mutual funds. Justice is an often quoted moot point of
Islamic finance. We find reason to question the equitability of mutual funds levying charges upon fund
unit holders when actual performance of investments rarely exceeds that of market benchmarks. The
discerning investor would be better off investing in index-linked funds (where fees imposed are minimal)
or considering making direct investments in equity markets. Why should investors pay fees to mutual
funds when after accounting for fees, negligible percentages of funds can be deemed truly skilled? Bear in
Table 4
Expense ratio, load factor, age and size of funds by alpha category. We compute the average expense ratio (annualized), load factor
(front, end or both), age (in years) and size (average weighted market capitalization in MYR billion) for each fund category —
negative, zero and positive alpha, for varying levels of significance. Averages are based on regression Eqs. (1) through (8), the
standard CAPM model.
Sig. level Fund alpha Expense ratio Load Age Size
0.05 Negative n/a n/a n/a n/a
Zero 1.55% 5.99% 11.0 37.3
Positive 1.40% 5.68% 7.1 27.6
0.1 Negative 1.02% 6.42% 11.7 107.7
Zero 1.57% 5.98% 11.2 37.5
Positive 1.27% 5.71% 6.8 25.8
0.15 Negative 1.04% 5.82% 11.5 119.4
Zero 1.59% 5.98% 11.4 36.8
Positive 1.25% 5.76% 6.0 28.7
0.2 Negative 1.10% 5.71% 12.1 118.1
Zero 1.59% 5.99% 11.3 36.9
Positive 1.27% 5.78% 6.2 29.6
0.3 Negative 1.27% 6.40% 22.4 58.3
Zero 1.59% 6.00% 11.0 38.9
Positive 1.34% 5.76% 6.8 30.5
0.4 Negative 1.45% 5.81% 20.2 51.2
Zero 1.58% 6.13% 11.2 41.2
Positive 1.40% 5.82% 7.3 28.9
23 Interestingly, in almost all cases, the average expense ratio for negative alpha funds is lower than that for positive alpha funds.
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mind also that in our analysis we have only incorporated expense ratios and excluded the one-off load
factors, which range from 5% to as high as 13%, with the typical fund imposing 6%.
Within a Shari'ah compliance framework, mutual funds are commonly positioned as wakalah-based
instruments. The fund manager is seen as serving the role as agent to the investor by providing the service of
making equity investments. In light of our findings, we argue that this “service”, for which the fund manager
charges a fee, warrants further deliberation. If it can be shown that the aforementioned service represents
substantial value-add to the investor (in the form of superior stock-picking skills, astute market timing
decisions, and portfolio allocation strategies that yield market-beating rates of return), there would indeed be
justification for the fees imposed. On the contrary, if the general outcome of the agent's work is merely market
rates of return (which the investor can easily replicate on his ownminus the fees) or is the result of simply luck
nearly half the time, as our empirical results suggest, we believe we have grounds to question the presence of
equity (or lack thereof) in current mutual fund remuneration arrangements. Our bone of contention is that
present Islamic equity funds are not equitable, in themanner that they levy fees for their purported services. As
an alternative to be considered, we propose the adoption of a profit-sharing based arrangement.
In essence, we suggest that the quantum of financial compensation to the fund manager should be a
function of returns actually generated. More specifically, the fund manager gets a share of profits
(predetermined percentage of profits) where profit is defined as return in excess of an agreed upon
benchmark. This way, the spirit of sharing is imbued in the mutual fund structure. When the value of the
investment portfolio rises, both parties (the client-investor and the fund manager) have a share in that gain.
Similarly, when the portfolio diminishes in value, both parties embrace the event of loss— the investor bears
diminution of his capital while the fund manager endures uncompensated effort. This arrangement is
characteristic of the Islamic nominate contract of mudarabah. We believe that this structure is an
improvement in at least two ways. Firstly, there is more equity in the way mutual funds make a profit for
themselves. Secondly, it provides effective incentive for the fundmanager to get his act together. After all, the
fund manager will not get paid if the portfolio under his management does not earn an adequate return.
Our proposal is exploratory in nature. Our focus in this paper is to offer statistical evidence which is
consistent with a case for an alternative remuneration structure, one based on profit sharing. Needless to say,
the proposal requires further deliberation and refinement before receiving serious consideration for
implementation. The mechanics of applying such a profit sharing scheme needs to be developed and put
under scrutiny. We leave that for a potential future undertaking. One issue that may be raised is that of
potential agency theory-related undesirable behavior. When we make the fund manager's remuneration
contingent upon positive capital gain of the portfolio, while this may encourage fund managers to work
harder to identify good investment opportunities, it may also induce them to throw caution to the wind and
invest recklessly. With nothing to lose and all to gain, fundmanagers may be tempted to allocatemuch of the
portfolio funds to highly risky stocks (with the potential of high returns). This may be detrimental to the
investor who risks his capital. One way to mitigate this risk is to make fund manager remuneration based on
risk-adjusted performance, but this may be problematic to implement, at best, and subject to abuse, at worst.
Another possible way of attempting to realign the interests of the fundmanager with those of the investor is
through the use of equity kickers. Obiyathulla (1997) introduces this innovative use of equity kickers in a
mudarabah contract. We briefly entertain the idea of using equity kickers in our context. In essence, the fund
manager also puts up an equity stake in the portfolio under his management. In a stipulated event of “loss”,
the fundmanager stands to lose part of his said equity stake. This serves as bothmeans to mitigate risk borne
by the investor as well as to act as a deterrent to curb reckless investing by the fund manager.
In a nutshell, our paper offers some tentative statistical evidence that Shari'ah compliant equity funds
using Malaysia as a case study do not perform significantly better than the overall market. In addition, a
significant proportion of superior performance can be attributed to simply luck. Given these, we propose
that Islamic mutual funds explore the idea of altering the remuneration structure of their product
offerings. In our humble opinion, embracing a profit-sharing mechanismmight perhaps better embody the
concept of equity which is fundamental in Islamic finance.
As a final note, we acknowledge that there are notable limitations inherent in our empirical work. Data
adequacy issues can perhaps be addressed by expanding the sample to include other Islamic markets.
Inclusion of other established performance measurement yardsticks could be useful for comparative
purposes. Dissecting the estimation period to account for crisis events would certainly be of value-add. We
leave these as suggestions for future research.
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Appendix A. Histograms of distribution of estimated p-values by regression equation
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Regression
equation
Negative alpha funds Positive alpha funds
Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.40 Sig. level
1 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 6.35% 7.94% 7.94% 17.46% 22.22% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 4.20% 6.30% 7.94% 12.61% 16.81% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.15% 1.63% 0.00% 4.86% 5.42% Skilled
2 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 4.76% 7.94% 7.94% 12.70% 23.81% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 3.97% 5.95% 7.94% 11.90% 15.87% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.79% 1.98% 0.00% 0.79% 7.94% Skilled
3 Significant 0.00% 3.17% 6.35% 7.94% 11.11% 12.70% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 6.35% 7.94% 12.70% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 3.00% 4.50% 6.00% 9.00% 12.00% 1.50% 3.00% 4.50% 6.00% 7.94% 12.00% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.17% 1.85% 1.94% 2.11% 0.70% 0.09% 1.76% 1.85% 0.35% 0.00% 0.70% Skilled
4 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 6.35% 7.94% 12.70% 20.63% 26.98% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 7.94% 1.59% 3.97% 5.95% 7.94% 11.90% 15.87% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.38% 1.98% 4.76% 8.73% 11.11% Skilled
5 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 6.35% 7.94% 0.00% 6.35% 7.94% 9.52% 15.87% 23.81% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 6.35% 7.94% 0.00% 3.97% 5.95% 7.94% 11.90% 15.87% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.38% 1.98% 1.59% 3.97% 7.94% Skilled
6 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 4.76% 9.52% 15.87% 23.81% 34.92% 42.86% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.32% 2.65% 3.97% 5.29% 7.94% 10.58% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.44% 6.88% 11.90% 18.52% 26.98% 32.28% Skilled
7 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 7.94% 0.00% 6.35% 9.52% 12.70% 20.63% 33.33% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 7.94% 0.00% 4.23% 6.35% 8.47% 12.70% 16.93% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.12% 3.17% 4.23% 7.94% 16.40% Skilled
8 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 12.70% 25.40% 41.27% 47.62% 57.14% 71.43% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.32% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 0.66% 1.32% 1.98% 2.65% 3.97% 5.29% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.04% 24.07% 39.29% 44.97% 53.17% 66.14% Skilled
9 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 6.35% 25.40% 33.33% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 0.74% 1.49% 2.23% 2.98% 4.46% 5.95% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.84% 3.27% 4.12% 3.37% 20.93% 27.38% Skilled
10 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 12.70% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 11.11% 20.63% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 12.70% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 10.71% 14.29% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 6.35% Skilled
Appendix B. Percentile Breakdowns of Fund Alphas by Regression Equation
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11 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 3.17% 1.59% 6.35% 11.11% 14.29% 22.22% 34.92% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 3.17% 0.66% 1.32% 1.98% 2.65% 3.97% 5.29% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.93% 5.03% 9.13% 11.64% 18.25% 29.63% Skilled
12 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 0.00% 4.76% 7.94% 11.11% 22.22% 30.16% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 4.76% 6.35% 0.00% 4.76% 7.33% 9.77% 14.65% 19.54% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.61% 1.34% 7.57% 10.62% Skilled
13 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 6.35% 7.94% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 6.35% 11.11% 23.81% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 6.35% 7.94% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 6.35% 11.11% 15.87% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.94% Skilled
14 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 3.17% 4.76% 9.52% 15.87% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 9.52% 17.46% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 3.17% 4.76% 9.52% 15.87% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 9.52% 15.87% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% Skilled
15 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 7.94% 12.70% 15.87% 33.33% 47.62% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 3.17% 1.19% 2.38% 3.57% 4.76% 7.14% 9.52% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.98% 5.56% 9.13% 11.11% 26.19% 38.10% Skilled
16 Significant 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 9.52% 12.70% 33.33% 41.27% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.16% 2.31% 3.47% 4.63% 6.94% 9.26% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.02% 2.45% 6.05% 8.07% 26.39% 32.01% Skilled
17 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 4.76% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 4.76% 6.35% 19.05% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 4.76% 1.59% 3.17% 4.76% 4.76% 6.35% 14.00% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.05% Skilled
18 Significant 0.00% 3.17% 7.94% 15.87% 19.05% 31.75% 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 9.52% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.32% 1.98% 2.65% 3.97% 5.29% 0.00% 1.32% 1.59% 1.59% 3.97% 5.29% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 1.85% 5.95% 13.23% 15.08% 26.46% 0.00% 0.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.79% 4.23% Skilled
19 Significant 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 7.94% 3.17% 6.35% 7.94% 9.52% 11.11% 20.63% Significant
Unlucky 0.00% 1.59% 1.59% 3.17% 3.17% 7.94% 1.49% 2.98% 4.46% 5.95% 8.93% 11.90% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.69% 3.37% 3.47% 3.57% 2.18% 8.73% Skilled
20 Significant 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 4.76% 1.59% 7.94% 20.63% 26.98% 33.33% 44.44% Significant
Unlucky 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 1.59% 4.76% 4.76% 1.59% 3.40% 5.10% 6.80% 10.20% 13.61% Lucky
Unskilled 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.54% 15.53% 20.18% 23.13% 30.84% Skilled
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